changes within the (selected) sample of workers from which measured wages are recorded. As in the selection bias literature,2 this second factor depends on the covariance between participation and wages. The final term measures the adjustment for composition changes in hours and depends on the size of the covariance between wages and hours. These bias terms are then investigated using data for male wages from the British economy in the 1980's and 1990's. These data analyses point to significant deviations between aggregate measures and individual measures, that give a substantively different picture of actual real wage growth over this period.
There are at least three reasons why the British labor market experience during the last two decades is particularly attractive for this analysis. First, there have been strong secular and cyclical movements in male employment over this period. Second, there exists a long and representative time series of individual survey data, collected at the household level, that records detailed information on individual hourly wages as well as many other individual characteristics and income sources. Finally, over this period, there has been a systematic change in the level of real out-of-work income. The household survey data utilized in this study allows an accurate measure of this income variable which, in turn, acts as an informative instrument in controlling for participation in our analysis of wages.
Labor market behavior in Britain over the recent past serves to reinforce the importance of these issues. Indeed the relationship between wage growth and employment in Britain has often been the focus of headline news3 Figure 1 displays the time series of aggregate hourly wages and aggregate employment for men in the United Kingdom over two business cycles between 1978 and 1996 . In 1978 , over 90 percent of men aged between 19 and 59 were employed. The participation rate fell dramatically in the recession of the early 1980's and then recovered somewhat in the late 1980's (although not to its initial level). In the early 1990's there was a further See Heckman (1979 recession and another sharp decline in participation. In contrast, log average wages show reasonably steady increase from 1978 through the 1990's. growing more than 30 percent in real terms over this period and even displaying growth during the severe recession of the early 1990's.
The analysis presented in this paper shows this picture of the evolution of real wages to be highly misleading. Making our three corrections reveals no evidence of real growth whatsoever in the early 1990's, and that over the whole period, real wage growth was no more than 20 percent. We show this corrected series is precisely estimated and robust to parametric specification. With our micro-level data, we can directly measure the large discrepancy in the level and growth between the aggregate and individual wage paths, and we find that it is almost completely captured by the aggregation factors we develop. This validates our model specification and supports our interpretation of the overall aggregation biases involved. The large discrepancy is clearly associated with an important upward bias in the aggregate trend of real wages and a reduction in the degree of procyclicality.
The picture of employment fluctuations is even more dramatic between education groups and date-of-birth cohorts. Given the strong interest in the economics literature on returns to education across education and cohort groups (see Amanda Gosling et al., 2000 and David Card and Thomas Lernieux, 2001, for Figure 5 shows the time-series variation of outof-work benefit income for a particularly relevant group-married low-education men in rented housing. The housing component of benefit income5 increased sharply in real terms over the period 1978 to 1996, an increase which was largely dnven by a policy shift from subsidized public sector rents and rent controls in the private rented sector toward a system where rent levels more closely reflected the market value of housing. This increase in this housing component is a major contributory factor in the rise in benefit income for the "low-education" families depicted in Figure 3 .
Although it is unlikely that variation in real value of benefit income can explain all of the variation in participation rates, we argue that changes in real benefits serve as an important instrument in the participation decision, which therefore affect the endogenous selection in real wages. Moreover, we can isolate the selection effects in part because the housing benefit varies strongly across time, location, and cohort group. This variation occurs because individuals with low levels of education in the older cohorts had a much higher chance of spending their lives in public housing. We take this variation to be exogenous to the individual decision to work (conditional on cohort, education, region, trend, and cycle effects), and find evidence of substantial selection effects that vary over the economic cycle and across education groups.
The layout of the remainder of this paper is as follows. Section I gives the modeling framework that underlies the empirical work, and presents the aggregation bias terms.6 As discussed above, these terms are particularly informative when there have been dramatic and systematic changes in the distributions of hourly wages, hours of work, and in participation rates-features that have occurred both secularly and cyclically in Britain as well as Europe as a whole. Our application to real wages of men in Britain, presented in Section 11, well illustrates this value. We find important impacts of wage heterogeneity and labor participation on the interpretation of observed aggregate wages-impacts that differ in magnitude and direction. For example, changes in the dispersion of individual wages lead to a secular increase in the bias of aggregate wages; in contrast, compositional changes induced by labor market participation lead to a countercyclical bias in the aggregate measure. Section I11 draws some conclusions.
The bias terms are derived from new results on aggregation with lognormal distributions, as spelled out in the Appendix.
I. Aggregation and Selection

A. A Model for Real Wages
The approach we use for modeling individual wages follows Andrew Roy (1951) in basing wages on human capital or skill levels, assuming that any two workers with the same human capital level are paid the same wage. Thus we assume that there is no comparative advantage, and no sectoral differences in wages for workers with the same human capital level. We assume that the mapping of skills to human capital is time invariant, and that the price or return to human capital is not a function of human capital endowments. In particular, we begin with a framework consistent with the proportionality hypothesis of Heckman and Sedlacek (1990) .
The simplest version of the framework assumes that each worker i possesses a human capital (skill) level Hit, which is nondifferentiated in that it commands a single price r, in time period t. Worker i's wage is the value of his human capital, which may differ across cohorts j and education groups s. Suppose we assume human capital Hit is lognormally distributed7 with mean a, , and variance 2,then log wages are given by the additive equation where ei, is N O , g).* In this model the systematic growth in wages is common across workers (through r,); below we allow growth to differ across groups (e.g., by education) over time.
Reservation wages w; , are also assumed to be lognormal, with where 5, is NO, at). Here bit is the exogenous benefit level (out-of-work income) available to worker i, that varies with individual characteristics and time. Participation occurs if wit r wz and we represent the participation decision by the 'We utilize lognormality assumptions extensively in our derivations and their validity is assessed in the empirical analysis that follows.
* Clearly, there is an indeterminacy in the scaling of r,.
In our empirical work we normalize the value of r, for some year t = 0 (say, to r, = 1).
indicator I, = 1 [wit r w: ]. This is our base-level specification that maintains the proportionality hypothesis. There are no trend or cycle interactions with cohort or education level in either equation.
We are interested in how aggregate wages depend on the distribution of hours of work. One approach is to assume that the distribution of hours worked (when working) is uncorrelated with the participation decision. Alternatively, we can use a labor supply model where hours worked correlate with the incentives to participate. To see how aggregation bias is structured in that case, we consider the following simple model. Assume that desired hours hit are chosen by utility maximization, where reservation wages are defined as hit(w*) = h, and h, is the minimum number of hours available for full-time work.9 Assume that hit(w) is normally distributed for each w, and approximate desired hours by
This model is used in our bias form~lation.'~ Two extensions of this basic framework are made necessary by our empirical findings. First, suppose that education produces a differentiated type of human capital. That is, a high-education worker i has a skill price f and a low-education worker i skill price 6.As before, similar workers with a particular skill level are paid the same in all sectors. If d, is the high-education dummy, the log wage equation has the form This allows for a simple characterization of fixed costs; see John F. Cogan (1981) .
'O We could easily nest labor supply model with the situation of hours uncorrelated with participation, by adding another error term ui,to (3), which is uncorrelated with participation error but possibly correlated with the log wage error. This adds a further term to the hours adjustment given in the Appendix.
Here, education can have a time-varying impact on wages. The second extension is to allow the different stock of labor market experience that is associated with each cohort at any specific calender time to have an impact on returns. This generalizes the basic model to allow log wages to display different trend behavior for each dateof-birth cohort group.
To summarize our discussion, the underlying individual model is comprised of the following log wage equation, an hours equation, and an employment selection equation. We express these equations in compact form as 
B. Bias in Aggregate Wages
Measured wages at the individual level are represented by an entire distribution. Therefore, there are many ways to pose the question of whether aggregate wage movements adequately reflect movements in individual wages. The aggregate wage is measured by = el, where i E (I = 1) denotes a labor market participant and where e,, = hi,w,, is the earnings of individual i in period t , and where pit are the hours weights
We take the population of participating workers as sufficiently large so that we can ignore sampling variation in average earnings and average hours; modeling the aggregate wage as where E [.] refers to the mean across the population.
The basic framework suggests one natural comparison for interpreting w,. From (I), we could ask whether movements in the aggregate wage w, accurately reflect movements in the skill price r,. For instance, if aggregate production in the economy has total human capital (XiHi,) as an input, then the appropriate price for that input is r,, and so this comparison would ask whether i?, accurately reflects the relevant (quality-adjusted) price of labor. With differentiated skills, we could ask whether the aggregate wage iit, reflects an average of the various skill prices-for instance, if (4) applies, then we could compare iit, to a weighted average of < and $. Such comparisons of aggregate wages to skill prices are very natural, but require a human capital framework as the foundation of labor value.
Other interpretable comparisons arise on purely statistical grounds, such as comparing the aggregate wage I?, to the unweighted mean wage E(wi,). Following the tradition of measuring "returns" from coefficients in estimated log wage equations, we focus on the "log" version of this comparison, namely to compare
This approach is adopted by Gary Solon et al. (1994) , as well as in our empirical work below." We note that our choice of In wit follows one of the longest established traditions in empirical economics, where log wage is the primary object of analysis in studying individual earnings data [see Bany R. Chiswick (1970) , I' This statistical comparison captures the simplest skill price interpretation as well-if our basic framework applies, and if the log mean of Hi, is constant over time in our basic framework, then the mean log wage comparison matches the "Cv, versus r," comparison (in log form). We have raised these comparisons separately because one might be interested in the log wage comparison even without a framework tracing wages to human capital. Jacob Mincer (1972) , and Heckman (1974) , among many others].
We have extensive individual-level data on wages, and so we could examine aspects of how aggregate wage compares to average log wage empirically. Part of the contribution of this work is to give explicit representations of the biases in interpreting aggregate wages, using the indvidual model (5). To start, note that the mean log wage is simply This equation reflects the key parameters of interest: the mean log wage and the f3 coefficients. It also captures how the /3 coefficients are relevant to aggregates; changes in the mean predictor variables E(xi,) are multiplied by the p's for associated changes in mean log wage E(ln wit).
To analyze the observed aggregate wage, we characterize the large sample approximation (7) by applying some new results on aggregation with nonlinear models. For that purpose, we assume that the indexes Po + p l x and a, + a'zare (bivariate) normally distributed in each time period t . We can clearly apply our results to any population segment where this normality assumption is valid.
Our main result is summarized as follows. For each time period t , we have = E(ln wi,) + DSP, + SEL, + HR,.
These are the three bias terms; DSP, for bias from wage dispersion, SEL, for bias deriving from compositional changes in the (selected) sample of workers, and HR, for bias from heterogeneity in hours worked.
The simplest term is DSP,, for wage dispersion, and it is equal to ?htimes the variance of log wages at time t. This arises because the standard micro model is for log wages (with variance associated with proportional variation across workers), but for observed aggregate 
B. Results
We consider a number of possible specifications for our individual-level participation and wage equations which relate to the various specifications discussed in Section I. Our model of participation includes the out-of-work income (the simulated benefit income variable) interacted with marital status, as well as the variables included in the log wage equation. The X 2 test reported in the first row of Table 3 shows that the benefit income variable is strongly significant in the participation (probit) equation. This is important as it is our key source of identifying (age, region, etc.) . This is an identifying restriction which is not directly testable. We do carry out specification testing by conducting joint significance tests for sets of regressors and interactions between them. These are presented in the remaining rows of Table 3 for the participation probit and the wage equation with the selectivity correction via the inverse Mills ratio. In estimation we are unable to use data on housing benefit for the year 1983. This is because the system of benefit assistance for tenants was reformed in 1983 and the information on rent levels and benefit receipts was not collected properly by Family Expenditure Survey interviewers. We do, however, have a consistent series for 1978-1982 and 1984-1996 . Below we present results for the complete period 1978-1996 omitting 1983 data.
The chosen specification, which the results below focus on, models participation and wages l 9 The full results are available on the AER web site (http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/contents/) as Supplement B to the paper. as a function of the three education groupings, cohort dummies, a cubic trend, and region, plus interactions between the cubic trend and education, cubic trend and cohort, education and cohort, linear trend by education and cohort, and a quadratic trend times region. This specification was chosen in comparison to a number of alternatives through a standard specification search. Further details of the validation of this model are presented in the model validation section below. The necessity of the inclusion of the interaction terms means that our preferred specification of the log wage equation departs from the full proportionality hypothesis as set out in Section I. The additional interactions between cohort and education and trend which we introduce could reflect many differences in minimum educational standkds across cohorts such as the systematic raising of the minimum schoolleaving age over the postwar period in the United Kingdom. Meanwhile the prices of different (education-level) skills are allowed to evolve in different ways, by including an interaction between the education dummies and the trend terms. The selectivity correction using the inverse Mills ratio from the participation equation is interacted with marital status and by education group, because first, the way out-ofwork income is defined implies that it attains different levels for single and married people, and second, it is quite possible that selection may have different effects at different skill levels. For example, an increase in the level of out-of-work income which families can expect to receive when unemployed might have a larger impact among lower-educated groups, where the financial net returns to working are lower, than among graduates or other highly educated groups, where the ratio of out-of-work income to in-work income may still be very low. As Table 3 shows, the benefit income terms are strongly significant in the participation equation and the selectivity correction, education, cohort, and trend terms are all significant in the wage equation.
TABLẼ --S I G N~C A N C E
Aggregate Wages and Corrections: Overall Sample Measures.-We now consider aggregate wages and the corrections due to heterogeneity, the distribution of hours, and labor participation.20 These correction terms are constructed separately for each year as described in Section I. We plot the values over time to allow a quick assessment of the path of aggregate wages and the relative importance of the corrections, as well as how well the corrected Figure 6 . This displays the behavior of all the measures of wages we look at over the entire period. The raw aggregate earnings index is the aggregate measure of wages calculated as the log of average wages for those in work; this shows an increase of 34 percent over the period [1978] [1979] [1980] [1981] [1982] [1983] [1984] [1985] [1986] [1987] [1988] [1989] [1990] [1991] [1992] [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] .~' The remaining three lines shown on the figure give the (cumulative) application of the correction terms to aggregate wages. First is the correction for the distribution of hours [HR, in (9) ]. As we may have expected given the relatively stable pattern of hours worked, this has little impact on the time-series evolution of wages. Second is the selection correction for covariance between wages and participation [SEL, in (9) ]. This has a more dramatic effect, with growing gaps over time associated with large decreases in participation-it reduces the estimated increase in wages over the period to around 28 percent. Finally, we apply the correction for the heterogeneity (dispersion) of individual wages [DSP, in (9) ]. This gives the impact of the increasing heterogeneity in wages that is separated from participation effects. This final series gives the 2' This is also calculated from the FES and corresponds closely to the measure of "average earnings," which media commentators in the United Kingdom have focused on. aggregate wage after all corrections, and shows a growth over the period of only 20 percent.
In order to see the relative growth of the various series more clearly, Figure 7 shows exactly the same aggregate wage measure and the fully corrected aggregate series, but rebased to 1 9 7 8 .~~ Plotting each series starting at the 1978 level makes it easier to see what the implementation of the adjustment formula does to the measured aggregate hourly earnings growth. For comparison, we also plot the mean log wage (8) implied by the bias-corrected micro regressions (adjusted for participation, or omitting the selection term). A key evaluation of our framework is whether the fully corrected aggregate series lines up with this selectivity-adjusted micromodel prediction. The figure shows that there is a very close correspondence between the series. Later on we use bootstrap methods to check whether any difference which does arise between the micromodel and the corrected aggregate series is statistically significant.
Several features of this figure are noteworthy. For instance, the direction of movement of the uncorrected log aggregate wage does not always mirror that of the mean micro log wage. During the recession of the early 1980's, aggregate wages grow rather more than the corrected micromodel wage. While there is a reasonably close correspondence between the trend of the two lines in the latter half of the 1980's, in the 1990's we find that there is a reasonably substantial increase in log aggregate wages but essentially no growth in the corrected measure. Figure 7, which rebases to 1978, shows these patterns even more vividly. Correcting for selection over the period reduces our estimate of real aggregate wage growth from over 30 percent to around 20 percent.
Wage Measures by Education Group.-Next we break our sample up by the three education groups used in the analysis. We plot the wage series defined just as before but this time we are taking the rnicromodel prediction, the "aggregate" wage series and the corrections to the aggregate series within education group for each year. Hence we have three plots in Figures  8-10 , which present the path of the series for each education group.
For the low-education group-those that left full-time education at age 16 or younger-the picture is particularly clear. This is presented in Figure 8 . Controlling for the biases induced by shifts in participation rates over the 1980's and 1990's reduces our estimate of average wage growth for this group from over 20 percent to around 10 percent. The corrected aggregate series and the selectivity-adjusted micromodel prediction appear to line up very well here.
For those individuals with more schooling, presented in the subsequent Figures 9 and 10 , the fit between the two series is less good largely because these are smaller subsarnples, and so the data on wages for them is more noisy. Nevertheless, there appears to be evidence that selection effects do bias measured wage growth estimates upwards for both of the better-educated groups.
Education Returns by Cohort.-Disaggregating wages by education and cohort reveals another important aspect of the impact of participation on aggregate wages. As we noted in the introduction, the employment rate fell sharply over this period with strong cohort differences. Figures 11-13 graph the estimated returns with and without the correction factors for three different cohorts: those born between 1935 and 1944 (who were the oldest cohort with representatives in every sample year), those born between 1945 and 1954, and those born between 1955 and 1964 (who were the youngest). It is very noticeable how strongly the returns increased in the early 1980's but equally interesting how the increase is only maintained into the 1990's for the youngest cohort.
The impact of selection effects on returns is clearly important. In Figures 14-16 the timeseries variation in the selection bias term is presented for each cohort. This follows the cyclical pattern of employment-as one might BORN 1955 BORN -1964 expect given the analysis presented so far. But what is rather more interesting is how dispersion effects often operate in the opposite direction to selection effects. Increasing dispersion biases the aggregate wage upward, whereas se-, , BORN 1955 BORN -1964 lection biases the aggregate wage downward. For groups with greater dispersion, such as the higher educated, those effects can be substantial. For instance, in the case of the older cohort illustrated in Figure 14 , those two impacts roughly cancel each other from the late 1980's through the 1990's.
C. Model Validation
Our model and its underlying econometric assumptions have been tested as far as is possible in order to ascertain their plausibility. The validation procedures undertaken include (a) a check to see whether the corrections to aggregate wages line them up sufficiently well with the predictions from the selectivity-adjusted micromodel, (b) relaxing the normality assumption on the unobservables by estimating an analogous model using semiparametric methods, and (c) plots of the predicted indices from the probit and the wage equation to assess whether the distributions of observable attributes conform to normality. We now assess each of these in turn.
Bootstrapping the Accuracy of the Model Fit.-To assess the accuracy with which the corrections which we make to the aggregate average male log wage series "line up" against the prediction from our micromodel of wages (with the selectivity correction included), we used bootstrap methods to simulate the difference between the two measures. This involved sampling with replacement from the Family Expenditure Survey data and reestimating the micromodel a total of 500 times. The 95-percent confidence intervals on the bootstrapped micromodel prediction are shown in Figure 17 together with the corrected aggregate wage series.23 The figure shows that the two measures are not significantly different over the period covered by the sample. Occasionally the corrected aggregate measure is higher than the 95 percent upper bound on the micromodel prediction, but in general the two series line up very well. This provides a very positive validation of the model framework.
Semiparametric Estimation.--Our model, as set out in Section I, makes the assumption that the unobservable factors affecting participation and wages are normally distributed. This can of course be called into question. The properties of the estimator rely on the parametric distributional assumptions on the joint distribution of the errors. However, given our exclusion assumption on the continuous out-of-work income variable, semiparametric estimation can proceed in a fairly straightforward manner. To estimate the slope parameters we follow the suggestion of Peter M. Robinson (1988) which is developed in Hyungtaik Ahn and James L. Powell (1993) . These techniques are explored in a useful application to labor supply by Whitney K. Newey et al. (1990) . In Figure 18 we graph a comparison between the predicted wages estimated using semiparametric techniques and the wage predictions from the selectivityadjusted micromodel which we use. Bootstrap confidence bands (95 percent) refer to the parametric selectivity model. There is a very close correspondence between the predictions from the parametric micromodel and the semiparametric version. We conclude that the assumption 23 Very similar results, broken down by educational group, are available from the authors on request. Normality of the Wage and Participation Zndexes.-In addition to checking the validity of the normality assumption on the unobservable~, we are also interested in the normality of the probit index and of the fitted wage distribution from the selectivity-adjusted wage equation. Taking the participation probit first of all, Figure 19 plots the distribution of the standardized probit index &'z over all years of the sample (plots for individual years are all quite similar). The index is distributed roughly normally although with a slight negative skew. 24 We also checked the validity of the normality assumption on log wages by plotting the standardized wage predictions from the model overlaid with a standard normal curve. This is shown in Figure 20 . The distribution is not obviously skewed left or right, and there appears to be a higher density of observations around the mean than is the case with a standard normal. In any case, while these plots do not show exact concordance with the normal distribution assumptions, we feel that the proximity of the empirical distributions to normal helps explain the close correspondence between corrected aggregate wages and the mean wages implied by the micro regressions.25 
III. Conclusion
This aim of this paper has been to provide a systematic assessment of the way changes in labor market participation affect our interpretation of aggregate real wages. We have developed and implemented an empirical framework for understanding this relationship which reduces to the calculation of three aggregation factors. These can be interpreted as correction terms reflecting changes in the distribution of retums, changes in selection due to participation, and changes in hours of work, respectively. We have shown that they do a remarkably good job of explaining the differences between individual and aggregate wages in the British context.
British data was used for three reasons. First, there have been significant changes in labor market participation over the last two decades. Participation rates for men have seen a secular decline and have displayed strong cyclical variation. The secular decline is largely reflected in increasing decline in participation among older men across cohorts while the cyclical variation shows strong regional variation. This phenomenon is common to many other developed economies. Second, in Britain, there are strong changes in real wages and the distribution of real wages over this sample period. Third, there is important exogenous variation in certain components of out-of-work incomes across time and across individuals that allows the identification of the correction terms. summarized in the difference between the plots from the corrected aggregate measure and the micromodel. As we have noted above these plots are extremely close.
The empirical analysis of aggregate wages is sion and for selection in characterizing the shown to provide a coherent picture of the redistortion in the measurement of wage growth lationship between individual male wages and from aggregate data. Most noteworthy is how aggregated wages over this period. Moreover, mean individual log wages are largely flat the statistical model adopted appears to acthroughout the early 1990's, whereas measured cord well with the empirical facts. The correcaggregate wages are rising. As such, we see tion terms explain the differences between log our estimates as giving clear evidence that aggregate wages and the average of log wages the biases in log aggregate real wages are subimplied by our analysis. The differences are stantial and can lead to misleading depictions interesting and have valuable implications.
of the progress of wages of individual male They show an important role for wage disperworkers.
This Appendix presents the explicit formulations of biases in aggregate wages, as well as the aggregation results on which they are based. The mathematical details are provided on the AER web site as Supplement A (see http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/contents/) and draw on the work of Daniel McFadden and Fred Reid (1975) and Thomas E. MaCurdy (1987) .
The aggregation results apply to aggregate of nonlinear relationships over normal and lognormal distributions. We make use of standard formulae familiar from the analysis of selection bias, as well as some further results that we present in Lemma Al. A proof of Lemma A1 is given in Supplement A.
Assume that (U, v ) are jointly normal random variables: namely and denote I = 1 [ v < 01 and ln w= U .
The formulations of aggregate participation utilize the "probit" formula The following correspondence allows application of the results:
where U is the log wage and wis the wage (level). The assumption establishes normality as in (Al), with parameters given as
The bias results follow from working out (lo), ( l l ) , and (12) Finally, our remarks in Section I, subsection C, are substantiated by noting that an increase in skill price r, reduces the selection bias term; we have with the term in brackets negative when PfZ,,a
